Communism and the Incentive to Share in Science

被引:22
|
作者
Heesen, Remco [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Cambridge, Fac Philosophy, Sidgwick Ave, Cambridge CB3 9DA, England
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
SCIENTIFIC PRODUCTION; STATISTICAL-ANALYSIS; COLLABORATION; INVENTIVITY; DISCOVERY; SOCIOLOGY; PATTERNS; CHAPTER; AUTHORS;
D O I
10.1086/693875
中图分类号
N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;
摘要
The communist norm requires that scientists widely share the results of their work. Where did this norm come from, and how does it persist? I argue on the basis of a game-theoretic model that rational credit-maximizing scientists will in many cases conform to the norm. This means that the origins and persistence of the communist norm can be explained even in the absence of a social contract or enforcement, contrary to recent work by Michael Strevens but adding to previous work emphasizing the benefits of the incentive structure created by the priority rule.
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页码:698 / 716
页数:19
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