Approximately optimal bidding policies for repeated first-price auctions

被引：0
|
作者：
Danak, Amir [1 ]
Mannor, Shie [2 ]
机构：
[1] McGill Univ, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Montreal, PQ, Canada
[2] Technion Israel Inst Technol, Dept Elect Engn, IL-32000 Haifa, Israel
来源：
ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH | 2012年 / 196卷 / 01期
关键词：
Mathematical optimization; Approximation methods; Game theory; Bayesian equilibrium; Repeated games; Auctions; Decision-making problems;
D O I：
10.1007/s10479-012-1148-8
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号：
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
We suggest approximately optimal bidding strategies for games, where similar items are auctioned repeatedly. Considering players' bounded rationality in practice, the results can further motivate the application of market-based approaches in resource allocation problems. We specialize the bidding algorithm for first-price payment schemes, the building blocks of several simplified selling mechanisms, that are common in practice.
引用
收藏
页码：189 / 199
页数：11
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Approximately optimal bidding policies for repeated first-price auctions
    Amir Danak
    Shie Mannor
    Annals of Operations Research, 2012, 196 : 189 - 199
  • [2] Leveraging The Hints: Adaptive Bidding in Repeated First-Price Auctions
    Zhang, Wei
    Han, Yanjun
    Zhou, Zhengyuan
    Flores, Aaron
    Weissman, Tsachy
    ADVANCES IN NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS 35 (NEURIPS 2022), 2022,
  • [3] Bidding clubs in first-price auctions
    Leyton-Brown, K
    Shoham, Y
    Tennenholtz, M
    EIGHTEENTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AAAI-02)/FOURTEENTH INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE (IAAI-02), PROCEEDINGS, 2002, : 373 - 378
  • [4] Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions
    Battigalli, P
    Siniscalchi, M
    GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2003, 45 (01) : 38 - 72
  • [5] Optimal No-Regret Learning in Repeated First-Price Auctions
    Han, Yanjun
    Weissman, Tsachy
    Zhou, Zhengyuan
    OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 2025, 73 (01)
  • [6] The effect of corruption on bidding behavior in first-price auctions
    Arozamena, Leandro
    Weinschelbaum, Federico
    EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2009, 53 (06) : 645 - 657
  • [7] Collusion enforcement in repeated first-price auctions
    Zhang, Wenzhang
    THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 2022, 17 (04) : 1847 - 1895
  • [8] Estimating damages from bidding rings in first-price auctions
    Gabrielli, M. Florencia
    Willington, Manuel
    ECONOMIC MODELLING, 2023, 126
  • [9] Optimal Ring Size at First-Price Auctions
    Tu, Zhiyong
    Ju, Lan
    JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT, 2015, 171 (04): : 609 - 621
  • [10] Does displaying probabilities affect bidding in first-price auctions?
    Ratan, Anmol
    ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2015, 126 : 119 - 121
12345