Can Reporting Norms Create a Safe Harbor? Jury Verdicts against Auditors under Precise and Imprecise Accounting Standards

被引:47
|
作者
Kadous, Kathryn [1 ]
Mercer, Molly [2 ]
机构
[1] Emory Univ, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA
[2] Depaul Univ, Chicago, IL 60604 USA
来源
ACCOUNTING REVIEW | 2012年 / 87卷 / 02期
关键词
audit litigation; principles versus rules; jury decision making; IFRS; PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS; CULPABLE CONTROL; PRINCIPLES; PSYCHOLOGY; QUALITY; IFRS;
D O I
10.2308/accr-10203
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We conduct an experiment with 749 mock jurors to examine whether juries Evaluate auditors differently under precise versus imprecise standards when the client reporting is held constant. We find that the impact of standard precision on jury verdicts depends on the aggressiveness of the audit client's financial reports and on the industry reporting norm. When the client's reporting is more aggressive and violates the precise standard, juries return fewer verdicts against auditors under the imprecise standard, especially when the reporting complies with the industry norm. When the client's reporting is less aggressive and complies with the precise standard, juries return more verdicts against auditors under the imprecise standard, but only when the client's reporting is more aggressive than the industry norm. Compliance with industry reporting norms appears to provide auditors with safe harbor protection from negligence verdicts when accounting standards are imprecise.
引用
收藏
页码:565 / 587
页数:23
相关论文
empty
未找到相关数据