Self-Selection of Peers and Performance

被引:5
|
作者
Kiessling, Lukas [1 ]
Radbruch, Jonas [2 ]
Schaube, Sebastian [3 ]
机构
[1] Max Planck Inst Res Collect Goods, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
[2] Inst Lab Econ IZA, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
[3] Fed Minist Econ Affairs & Climate Act, D-11019 Berlin, Germany
关键词
peer effects; self-selection; autonomy; framed field experiment; FIELD EXPERIMENT; WORK EVIDENCE; INCENTIVES; TRACKING; ASSIGNMENT; ECONOMICS; COACTION; GENDER; SCHOOL;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.2021.4267
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
This paper studies how the presence of peers and different peer assignment rules-self-selection versus random assignment-affect individual performance. Using a framed field experiment, we find that the presence of a randomly assigned peer improves performance by 28% of a standard deviation (SD), whereas self-selecting peers induces an additional 15%-18% SD improvement in performance. Our results document peer effects in multiple characteristics and show that self-selection changes these characteristics. However, a decomposition reveals that variations in the peer composition contribute only little to the performance differences across peer assignment rules. Rather, we find that self-selection has a direct effect on performance.
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页码:8184 / 8201
页数:19
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