An Analysis of Principal-Agent Relationship Under the Engineering Supervision Institution

被引:0
|
作者
Cao, Yugui [1 ]
Xiao, Chaolan [1 ]
Liu, Xiaochun [1 ]
机构
[1] North China Univ Water Resources & Elect Power, Dept Econ & Management, Zhengzhou 450000, Peoples R China
关键词
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The author establishes a principal-agent model which takes the scale of owner's investment, the qualities of engineering supervision, the effects of exogenous random variables and some other factors into consideration. Then the author analyzes the influence of all the factors above on incentive intensity coefficient, and conducts an extensive research on the principal-agent relationship between the owner and the engineering supervision. At last, the author puts forward some key factors which must be considered in designing an incentive mechanism of engineering supervision.
引用
收藏
页码:1053 / 1059
页数:7
相关论文
共 50 条