Managerial stock options and the hedging premium

被引：13
|
作者：
Hagelin, Niclas
Holmen, Martin
Knopf, John D.
Pramborg, Bengt
机构：
[1] Uppsala Univ, Dept Econ, SE-76120 Uppsala, Sweden
[2] Swedish Natl Debt Off, SE-10374 Stockholm, Sweden
[3] Univ Connecticut, Stamford, CT 06901 USA
[4] Stockholm Univ, Sch Business, SE-10691 Stockholm, Sweden
来源：
EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT | 2007年 / 13卷 / 04期
关键词：
hedging; managerial incentives; firm value;
D O I：
10.1111/j.1468-036X.2007.00380.x
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
Previous studies have found mixed evidence on whether hedging increases firm value. Some studies have shown that managerial incentives may influence firm hedging. In this paper we provide evidence that when hedging is based upon incentives from managers' options, firm value decreases.
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页码：721 / 741
页数：21
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