Moral naturalism;
Moral objectivity;
Relativism;
Moral progress;
Moral epistemology;
Evolutionary ethics;
Is-ought problem;
Altruism;
EVOLUTION;
ALTRUISM;
PROGRESS;
REALISM;
D O I:
10.1007/s10677-017-9798-x
中图分类号:
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号:
01 ;
0101 ;
摘要:
The naturalistic approach to metaethics is sometimes identified with a supervenience theory relating moral properties to underlying descriptive properties, thereby securing the possibility of objective knowledge in morality as in chemistry. I reject this approach along with the purely anthropological approach which leads to an objectionable form of relativism. There is no single method for arriving at moral objectivity any more than there is a single method that has taken us from alchemy to modern chemistry. Rather, there is an ensemble of (cognitive) instruments, techniques, experiments and observations that contribute to eliminating moral error, delivering what we are entitled to call greater objectivity.
机构:
Univ Roma La Sapienza, Dipartimento Filosofia, Via Carlo Fea 2, I-00161 Rome, ItalyUniv Roma La Sapienza, Dipartimento Filosofia, Via Carlo Fea 2, I-00161 Rome, Italy