Not-for-profit entrepreneurs

被引:271
作者
Glaeser, EL [1 ]
Shleifer, A [1 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Littauer Ctr, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
soft incentives; non-profit; entrepreneur; donations;
D O I
10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00130-4
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Entrepreneurs who start new firms may choose not-for-profit status as a means of committing to soft incentives. Such incentives protect donors, volunteers, consumers and employees from ex post expropriation of profits by the entrepreneur. We derive conditions under which completely self-interested entrepreneurs opt for not-for-profit status, despite the fact that this status limits their ability to enjoy the profits of their enterprises. We also show that even in the absence of tax advantages, unrestricted donations would flow to non-profits rather than for-profit firms because donations have more significant influence on the decisions of the non-profits. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:99 / 115
页数:17
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