Sovereigns at risk: A dynamic model of sovereign debt and banking leverage

被引:9
|
作者
Coimbra, Nuno [1 ]
机构
[1] Paris Sch Econ, 48 Blvd Jourdan, Paris 75014, France
关键词
Banking; Asset pricing; Sovereign default; Fiscal limits; FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION; DEPOSIT INSURANCE; POLICY; DEFAULT; COSTS; RUNS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jinteco.2020.103298
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper develops a dynamic model with heterogeneous investors and sovereign default to analyze the dynamic link between banking sector capitalization and sovereign bond yields. The banking sector is modelled as operating under a Value-at-Risk (VaR) constraint, which can bind occasionally. As default risk rises, the constraint may bind, generating a fall in demand for sovereign bonds that can be accompanied by a rise in the risk premium if other agents are more risk averse. In turn, the rise in risk premium leads to a feedback effect through debt accumulation dynamics and the probability of government default. (C) 2020 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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页数:21
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