Too Big To Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts, and Corporate Responsibility

被引:0
|
作者
Schwarcz, Steven L. [1 ,2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Duke Univ, Sch Law, Law & Business, Durham, NC 27706 USA
[2] Duke Global Financial Mkt Ctr, Durham, NC 27708 USA
[3] Ctr Int Governance Innovat, Waterloo, ON, Canada
关键词
RISK-TAKING; SYSTEMIC RISK; TRADE-OFF; BANKING; LESSONS; HISTORY; TENSION; FAIL; LAW;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:761 / 801
页数:41
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