Large shareholders and value creation through corporate acquisitions in Europe. The identity of the controlling shareholder matters

We investigate whether and how major shareholders influence M&A wealth effects for listed acquirers in Europe. To that end, we examine 342 intra-European takeovers of listed target firms announced between 1997 and 2007. We find that family-controlled acquiring firms on average engage in deals with substantially larger value creation, particularly in Continental Europe. However, this positive family effect disappears in industry-diversifying acquisitions, consistent with the idea that those family-controlled firms may also pursue corporate diversification through M&As in order to diversify the family wealth. Moreover, family owners across Europe cannot curb low-value acquisitions driven by managerial overconfidence. We relate this finding to the strong connections of family owners with management in family-controlled firms. Next, large institutional shareholders all over Europe are associated with the lowest-value deals, but they are able to limit the negative effects of managerial overconfidence. As to the division of M&A gains, we find that regardless of their identity, large acquirer shareholders tend to put their firm in a weaker negotiation position. Lastly, we find no robust support for the idea that major owners are less likely to pursue private benefits through M&As in countries with stronger investor protection. (c) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.