What Is the Reputational Cost of a Dishonest CEO? Evidence from US Illegal Insider Trading

被引：10
|
作者：
Engelen, Peter-Jan [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Utrecht, Sch Econ, Tjalling C Koopmans Res Inst, NL-3512 BL Utrecht, Netherlands
来源：
CESIFO ECONOMIC STUDIES | 2012年 / 58卷 / 01期
关键词：
Illegal insider trading; reputational penalty; market-induced enforcement; ethical culture; ETHICAL BEHAVIOR; JOB-SATISFACTION; MARKET FORCES; QUALITY; IMPACT; INFORMATION; RETURNS; WEALTH; FIRMS;
D O I：
10.1093/cesifo/ifr031
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This article examines whether companies experience a stock price decline for the corporate misconduct of their CEOs and top managers. We examine news announcements of illegal insider trading reported in US press during the period 1993 until 2008. We observe a clear negative abnormal return on the day of the newspaper coverage of the illegal insider trading practice of CEOs. Our empirical results show that companies bear a reputational cost in financial markets for the illegal insider trading practices of their CEO and top managers, but not for the illegal insider trading by other employees and outsiders. (JEL codes: G14, M14, K22, K42).
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页码：140 / 163
页数：24
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