Revenue-constrained strategic trade and industrial policy

被引:12
作者
Neary, JP [1 ]
Leahy, D
机构
[1] Univ Coll Dublin, Dept Econ, Dublin 4, Ireland
[2] CEPR, London, England
关键词
export subsidies; R&D subsidies; social cost of funds; strategic trade policy;
D O I
10.1016/j.econlet.2003.09.019
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We characterise optimal revenue-constrained trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies, prove that total net subsidy payments at the optimum are decreasing in the social cost of funds, and illustrate the implications in Cournot and Bertrand special cases. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:409 / 414
页数:6
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