Depth-Limited Solving for Imperfect-Information Games

被引:0
|
作者
Brown, Noam [1 ]
Sandholm, Tuomas [1 ]
Amos, Brandon [1 ]
机构
[1] Carnegie Mellon Univ, Dept Comp Sci, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
GO;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
A fundamental challenge in imperfect-information games is that states do not have well-defined values. As a result, depth-limited search algorithms used in single-agent settings and perfect-information games do not apply. This paper introduces a principled way to conduct depth-limited solving in imperfect-information games by allowing the opponent to choose among a number of strategies for the remainder of the game at the depth limit. Each one of these strategies results in a different set of values for leaf nodes. This forces an agent to be robust to the different strategies an opponent may employ. We demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach by building a master-level heads-up no-limit Texas hold' em poker AI that defeats two prior top agents using only a 4-core CPU and 16 GB of memory. Developing such a powerful agent would have previously required a supercomputer.
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页数:12
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