Odious Debt as a Principal-Agent Problem

被引:0
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作者
Sander, Frederico Gil [1 ]
机构
[1] World Bank, Young Profess Program, Poverty Reduct & Econ Management Unit E Asia & Pa, Washington, DC USA
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中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
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页码:229 / 260
页数:32
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