What we would (but shouldn't) do for those we love: Universalism versus partiality in responding to others' moral transgressions

被引:7
|
作者
Soter, Laura K. [1 ,2 ]
Berg, Martha K. [1 ]
Gelman, Susan A. [1 ]
Kross, Ethan [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Michigan, Dept Psychol, 1004 East Hall,530 Church St, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
[2] Univ Michigan, Dept Philosophy, 2215 Angell Hall,435 S State St, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Close relationships; Moral psychology; Moral universalism; Moral partiality; Inconsistency; SELF; HYPOCRISY; BEHAVIOR; EMPATHY; INEQUALITIES; DISCREPANCY; RESPONSES; ALTRUISM; RESOURCE; JUDGMENT;
D O I
10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104886
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
Recent work indicates that people are more likely to protect a close (vs. distant) other who commits a crime. But do people think it is morally right to treat close others differently? On the one hand, universalist moral principles dictate that people should be treated equally. On the other hand, close relationships are the source of special moral obligations, which may lead people to believe they ought to preferentially protect close others. Here we attempt to adjudicate between these competing considerations by examining what people think they would and should do when a close (vs. distant) other behaves immorally. Across four experiments (N = 2002), we show that people believe they morally should protect close others more than distant others. However, we also document a striking discrepancy: participants reported that they would protect close others far more than they should protect them. These findings demonstrate that people believe close relationships influence what they morally ought to do-but also that moral decisions about close others may be a context in which people are particularly likely to fail to do what they think is morally right.
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页数:12
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