Game Analysis between Government and Enterprises Considering Consumers' Low Carbon Awareness under the Carbon Tax Regulation

被引:0
|
作者
Wu, Mengjiao [1 ]
Hua, Guowei [1 ]
Xia, Liangjie [2 ]
机构
[1] Beijing Jiaotong Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100044, Peoples R China
[2] Tianjin Univ Finance & Econ, Business Sch, Mkt Dept, Tianjin 300202, Peoples R China
关键词
stackelberg game; consumers' low carbon awareness; emission reduction competition; technology research and development; technology spillover; GREENHOUSE-GAS EMISSIONS; ENVIRONMENTAL AWARENESS;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
In this paper, we consider the impact of both consumers' low carbon awareness and homogeneous products' emission reduction on the product price, and analyze the influence of consumers' low carbon awareness and enterprise competition on enterprise and government decisions, corporate profit and social welfare. We focuse on the carbon tax decision issue tackled by the government. The government and the duopoly business are the major players in the game. We build a Cournot model between enterprises, and a Stackelberg game model between the government and the enterprise. corporate profits and social welfare functions are build to determine the value of carbon tax, carbon emissions and production volume, as well as the factors affecting them. Under the premise of cooperation and competition between the duopoly enterprises, the influence of each factor on the decision-making is obtained through data simulation and comparative analysis. Some managerial insights are provided as well.
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页数:7
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