Double bank runs and liquidity risk management

被引:57
|
作者
Ippolito, Filippo [1 ,2 ]
Peydro, Jose-Luis [3 ,4 ]
Polo, Andrea [5 ,6 ]
Sette, Enrico [7 ]
机构
[1] Univ Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona GSE, Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, Barcelona 08005, Spain
[2] Univ Pompeu Fabra, CEPR, Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, Barcelona 08005, Spain
[3] Univ Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona GSE, ICREA, CREI, Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, Barcelona 08005, Spain
[4] Univ Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona GSE, ICREA, CEPR, Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, Barcelona 08005, Spain
[5] Univ Pompeu Fabra, Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, Barcelona 08005, Spain
[6] Barcelona GSE, Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, Barcelona 08005, Spain
[7] Bank Italy, Via Nazl 91, I-00184 Rome, Italy
基金
欧洲研究理事会;
关键词
Credit lines; Liquidity risk; Financial crisis; Runs; Basel III; MONETARY-POLICY; DEPOSIT INSURANCE; SHOCKS EVIDENCE;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.11.004
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
By providing liquidity to depositors and credit-line borrowers, banks can be exposed to double-runs on assets and liabilities. For identification, we exploit the 2007 freeze of the European interbank market and the Italian Credit Register. After the shock, there are sizeable, aggregate double-runs. In the cross-section, credit-line drawdowns are not larger for banks more exposed to the interbank market; however, they are larger when we condition on the same firms with multiple credit lines. We show that, ex-ante, more exposed banks actively manage their liquidity risk by granting fewer credit lines to firms that run more during crises. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:135 / 154
页数:20
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