The risks of mergers and acquisitions-Analyzing the incentives for risk reporting in Item 1A of 10-K filings

被引:20
|
作者
Ott, Christian [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Strasbourg, EM Strasbourg Business Sch, 61 Ave Foret Noire, F-67000 Strasbourg, France
关键词
Risk reporting; Risk level; Goodwill; Purchase price allocation; Content analysis; M-AND-A; CROSS-BORDER; INFORMATION-CONTENT; DISCLOSURE; FIRM; MARKET; GAINS; PRICE; DIVERSIFICATION; PERFORMANCE;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbusres.2019.08.028
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper investigates the motivations behind the associations between the M&A risk level and the M&A risk reporting. For a sample of 231 M&As, I performed a detailed content analysis of Item 1A of the 10-K filing after the completion of M&As. While the M&A risk reporting quantity captures the number of M&A risk factors, the M&A risk reporting quality additionally reflects the M&A risk reporting depth and width. The results suggest that the M&A risk reporting quantity and quality are related but not identical theoretical constructs. Overall, consistent with the transparency motivation, a higher M&A risk level encourages managers to increase the M&A risk reporting quantity and quality. Managers will disclose more M&A risk factors if the target firm is relatively large and from a foreign country, a relatively large amount of the purchase price is allocated to goodwill, and the M&A intensity is high.
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页码:158 / 181
页数:24
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