Correlated equilibrium in a nutshell

被引：1
|
作者：
Amir, Rabah [1 ]
Belkov, Sergei [2 ]
Evstigneev, Igor V. [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Iowa, Dept Econ, Iowa City, IA 52242 USA
[2] Univ Manchester, Dept Econ, Oxford Rd, Manchester M13 9PL, Lancs, England
来源：
THEORY AND DECISION | 2017年 / 83卷 / 04期
关键词：
Games with communication; Correlated strategies; Correlated equilibrium; 2; x; games;
D O I：
10.1007/s11238-017-9609-9
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We analyze the concept of correlated equilibrium in the framework of two-player two-strategy games. This simple framework makes it possible to clearly demonstrate the characteristic features of this concept. We develop an intuitive and easily memorizable test for equilibrium conditions and provide a complete classification of symmetric correlated equilibria in symmetric games.
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页码：457 / 468
页数：12
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