Incentive Contracts for Capacity Restoration Under Risk of Supply Disruption

We consider a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a buyer. The buyer faces demand as a function of the selling price. There is risk of supply disruption, but the supplier can rebuild his capacity if he has invested for the capacity restoration before a disruption. To motivate the supplier to invest, the buyer can use one of two incentive contracts, namely <italic>direct</italic> and <italic>indirect</italic>. With a direct contract, the buyer provides a financial subsidy to share the suppliers capacity restoration cost when disruption occurs. With an indirect contract, the buyer adjusts the wholesale price in the case of disruption to stimulate the capacity restoration. Both contracts allow the buyer to adjust the order quantity in the case of disruption. We analyze decisions of each supply chain member under the two contracts with different commitment strategies (the <italic>ex ante</italic> commitment (EA) strategy under which the contract is signed before disruption and the <italic>ex post</italic> commitment (EP) strategy under which the contract is signed after disruption), and study how the supply disruption affects the buyers selling price to end customers. We show that, from the perspective of either the supplier or the buyer, the incentive contract under the EA strategy is preferred by leading to a greater profit. Further, through numerical experiments, we recognize conditions for the fixed investment cost, probability of disruption, and regular wholesale price, under which each incentive contract encourages the supplier to invest for the capacity restoration, and brings greater profit to each supply chain member.