Integral Distinguishers of the Full-Round Lightweight Block Cipher SAT_Jo

被引:0
|
作者
Qiu, Xueying [1 ]
Wei, Yongzhuang [1 ,2 ]
Hodzic, Samir [3 ]
Pasalic, Enes [4 ]
机构
[1] Guilin Univ Elect Technol, Guilin 541004, Peoples R China
[2] State Key Lab Cryptol, POB 5159, Beijing 100878, Peoples R China
[3] Tech Univ Denmark, DTU Compute, Lyngby, Denmark
[4] Univ Primorska, FAMNIT, Koper, Slovenia
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
23;
D O I
10.1155/2021/5310545
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Integral cryptanalysis based on division property is a powerful cryptanalytic method whose range of successful applications was recently extended through the use of Mixed-Integer Linear Programming (MILP). Although this technique was demonstrated to be efficient in specifying distinguishers of reduced round versions of several families of lightweight block ciphers (such as SIMON, PRESENT, and few others), we show that this method provides distinguishers for a full-round block cipher SAT_Jo. SAT_Jo cipher is very similar to the well-known PRESENT block cipher, which has successfully withstood the known cryptanalytic methods. The main difference compared to PRESENT, which turns out to induce severe weaknesses of SAT_Jo algorithm, is its different choice of substitution boxes (S-boxes) and the bit-permutation layer for the reasons of making the cipher highly resource-efficient. Even though the designers provided a security analysis of this scheme against some major generic cryptanalytic methods, an application of the bit-division property in combination with MILP was not considered. By specifying integral distinguishers for the full-round SAT_Jo algorithm using this method, we essentially disapprove its use in intended applications. Using a 30-round distinguisher, we also describe a subkey recovery attack on the SAT_Jo algorithm whose time complexity is about 2(66) encryptions (noting that SAT_Jo is designed to provide 80 bits of security). Moreover, it seems that the choice of bit-permutation induces weak division properties since replacing the original bit-permutation of SAT_Jo by the one used in PRESENT immediately renders integral distinguishers inefficient.
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页数:9
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