Rhetoric, Reality, and Reputation: Do CSR and Political Lobbying Protect Shareholder Wealth against Environmental Lawsuits?

被引：34

作者：

Liu, Chelsea ^{[1
]}

Cheong, Chee Seng ^{[1
]}

Zurbruegg, Ralf ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Adelaide, Business Sch, Adelaide, SA, Australia

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS | 2020年 / 55卷 / 02期

关键词：

CORPORATE SOCIAL-RESPONSIBILITY; CONNECTED BOARDS; FIRM VALUE; RISK; MEDIA; GREEN; COST; LITIGATION; ADVANTAGE; PHILANTHROPY;

D O I：

10.1017/S0022109019000073

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We investigate whether firms' corporate social responsibility (CSR) reputations and environmental lobbying efforts protect shareholder wealth in the event of environmental lawsuits. Using a sample of lawsuits filed in United States Federal Courts, we find that firms with superior CSR reputations suffer worse market reactions to environmental allegations. In contrast, lobbying cushions filing-date valuation losses, providing insurance-like protection against lawsuits. Our results are robust to subsample analyses, a falsification test, propensity score matching, and alternative empirical proxies and model specifications.

引用

页码：679 / 706

页数：28