Agency, autonomy, and moral obligation

The paper proposes and, in part, defends an understanding of human agency, autonomy, and moral obligation as integral parts of our concept of a person. Specifically, the first parr (sects. 1-12) argues for a causal theory of action in which the acting person plays a central role in the causal history of her actions. The person exercises her causal influence according to normative principles of rationality. That presupposes some independence from her own motivation including the ability to acknowledge or reject parts of it as a basis of her rational decisions. This ability is constitutive of the autonomy of the person. The second part (sects. 13-29) presents an argument to the effect that the concept of autonomy presupposes a general universalist principle of morality Autonomy involves a distinction between motives that are 'authentic' and motives that are not. This distinction does not rest on a substantive idea of what autonomous action is, bur rather on a formal or procedural notion. Nevertheless, it presupposes a normative standard which is different front and largely independent of the motives a person in fact has. This standard can be found in the ideas of impartial benevolence and universal rational consent which inform universalist conceptions of morality.