Evaluating the Medical Malpractice System and Options for Reform

被引:83
|
作者
Kessler, Daniel P. [1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Stanford Univ, Stanford Law Sch, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[2] Stanford Univ, Grad Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[3] Stanford Univ, Hoover Inst, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[4] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
来源
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES | 2011年 / 25卷 / 02期
关键词
CESAREAN-SECTION RATES; NO-FAULT COMPENSATION; HEALTH-CARE; TORT REFORM; DEFENSIVE MEDICINE; ADVERSE EVENTS; QUALITY IMPROVEMENT; PRACTICE GUIDELINES; PATIENT SAFETY; NEGLIGENT CARE;
D O I
10.1257/jep.25.2.93
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The U.S. medical malpractice liability system has two principal objectives: to compensate patients who are injured through the negligence of healthcare providers and to deter providers from practicing negligently. In practice, however, the system is slow and costly to administer. It both fails to compensate patients who have suffered from bad medical care and compensates those who haven't. According to opinion surveys of physicians, the system creates incentives to undertake cost-ineffective treatments based on fear of legal liability-to practice "defensive medicine." The failures of the liability system and the high cost of health care in the United States have led to an important debate over tort policy. How well does malpractice law achieve its intended goals? How large of a problem is defensive medicine and can reforms to malpractice law reduce its impact on healthcare spending? The flaws of the existing system have led a number of states to change their laws in a way that would reduce malpractice liability-to adopt "tort reforms." Evidence from several studies suggests that wisely chosen reforms have the potential to reduce healthcare spending significantly with no adverse impact on patient health outcomes.
引用
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页码:93 / 110
页数:18
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