A puzzle about Hobbes on self-defense

The crucial step in Hobbes' argument for the right of self-defense in civil society is the claim that the parties to the Covenant for the establishment of civil society do not abandon the right when they agree to lay down a portion of their natural rights. The reason they do not abandon this right is that it is not to their benefit to do so. But there seem to be many situations in which a person would benefit by abandoning the right of self-defense. I consider several interpretations that would rescue Hobbes' argument on this point. It turns out that the argument Hobbes needs to defend his appeal to benefit relies on a straightforward maximizing conception of rationality. I argue, however, that the account of rationality Hobbes presupposes in his answer to the infamous Foole is altogether different: it is a pragmatic theory of rationality instead. I argue that as between his argument for the inalienability of self-defense and his argument against free-riding on the Social Contract, Hobbes has no choice but to side with the latter. I also suggest, however, that Hobbes might have argued for the existence of a right of self-defense by a somewhat different rout than the one he took. The reconstructed argument I propose depends upon a particular understanding of the right of self-defense in Hobbes' system: It regards the right as the central political protection parties to the Covenant might regard themselves as having against the usurpations of an all-powerful sovereign.