Social information processing in strategic decision-making: Why timing matters

In strategic decision situations, as modeled in games, the outcome depends on all decision-makers involved. In such situations, people make different decisions when they move simultaneously as compared to when they move sequentially without knowledge of prior moves. This is called the timing effect, which is not predicted by classic game theory. We hypothesize that pseudo-sequential game structures activate concepts of social interactions, which in turn increase individual's interpersonal trust and decreases cautiousness in situations of interdependence. Simultaneous game structures are more likely to activate concepts of games of chances, as a consequence of which the possibility of an actual total loss is more salient. In four experiments, participants played a coordination game either simultaneously or pseudo-sequentially. We manipulated processing time (Experiment 1), assessed participants' perception of game features (Experiment 2), manipulated activation of concepts such as social interaction (Experiment 3), and asked participants what decision they make being in a social interaction or a game of a chance (Experiment 4). The results support our hypothesis that different cognitive processes, which either intensify or diminish the focus on the other person, mediate the timing effect. In Experiment 5 we reversed the timing effect by embedding the game in a competitive context. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.