A reason for quantity regulation

被引：82

作者：

Glaeser, EL ^{[1
]}

Shleifer, A ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Harvard Univ, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2001年 / 91卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/aer.91.2.431

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：431 / 435

页数：5

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