CAPITAL REALLOCATION;
CAREER CONCERNS;
CEO TURNOVER;
INVESTMENT;
INCENTIVES;
REORIENTATION;
COMPENSATION;
MANAGEMENT;
GOVERNANCE;
CONTRACTS;
D O I:
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01619.x
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
This paper argues that the legacy potential of a firm's strategy is an important determinant of CEO compensation, turnover, and strategy change. A legacy makes CEO replacement expensive, because firm performance can only partially be attributed to a newly employed manager. Boards may therefore optimally allow an incumbent to be entrenched. Moreover, when a firm changes strategy it is optimal to change the CEO, because the incumbent has a vested interest in seeing the new strategy fail. Even though CEOs have no specific skills in our model, legacy issues can explain the empirical association between CEO and strategy change.
机构:
Ctr European Econ Res ZEW, Dept Ind Econ & Int Management, Mannheim, Germany
Tech Univ Dortmund, Fac Business Econ & Social Sci, Dortmund, GermanyKatholieke Univ Leuven, Dept Managerial Econ Strategy & Innovat, Leuven, Belgium
机构:
Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Sch Accounting & Finance, Hung Hom, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R ChinaHong Kong Polytech Univ, Sch Accounting & Finance, Hung Hom, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
机构:
Univ Alcala, Dept Econ & Business, Plaza Victoria,2, Madrid 28802, SpainUniv Alcala, Dept Econ & Business, Plaza Victoria,2, Madrid 28802, Spain
Di Meo, Fabrizio
Garcia Lara, Juan Manuel
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h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Carlos III Madrid, Dept Business Adm, Calle Madrid,126, Madrid 28903, SpainUniv Alcala, Dept Econ & Business, Plaza Victoria,2, Madrid 28802, Spain
Garcia Lara, Juan Manuel
Surroca, Jordi A.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Groningen, Dept Innovat Management & Strategy, Fac Econ & Business, NL-9747 AE Groningen, NetherlandsUniv Alcala, Dept Econ & Business, Plaza Victoria,2, Madrid 28802, Spain