Hidden action, risk aversion and variable fines in agri-environmental schemes
被引:11
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作者:
Ozanne, Adam
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机构:
Univ Manchester, Sch Social Studies, Manchester M13 9PL, Lancs, EnglandUniv Manchester, Sch Social Studies, Manchester M13 9PL, Lancs, England
Ozanne, Adam
[1
]
White, Ben
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Univ Western Australia, Sch Agr & Resource Econ, Nedlands, WA 6009, AustraliaUniv Manchester, Sch Social Studies, Manchester M13 9PL, Lancs, England
White, Ben
[2
]
机构:
[1] Univ Manchester, Sch Social Studies, Manchester M13 9PL, Lancs, England
[2] Univ Western Australia, Sch Agr & Resource Econ, Nedlands, WA 6009, Australia
This note analyses the design of agri-environmental schemes for risk-averse producers whose input usage is only observable by costly monitoring. The scheme penalises producers in proportion to input use in excess of a quota. A striking result is that if the scheme is designed in such a way that producers always comply with the quota, risk aversion is not relevant in determining the level of input use.
机构:
Univ Strasbourg, UMR GESTE MA 8101, Strasbourg, France
EIFER European Inst Energy Res EDF & KIT, Karlsruhe, GermanyUniv Strasbourg, UMR GESTE MA 8101, Strasbourg, France