Preferences for harmony and minority voting

被引：2
|
作者：
Fahrenberger, Theresa C. [1 ]
Gersbach, Hans [1 ]
机构：
[1] ETH, CER ETH, Ctr Econ Res, CH-8092 Zurich, Switzerland
来源：
MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES | 2012年 / 63卷 / 01期
关键词：
FAIRNESS;
D O I：
10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.06.002
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We examine repeated collective decisions in which people care about how others are treated. We formulate the notion of preferences for harmony as the desire of a person that others should not suffer repeatedly from the tyranny of majorities. We suggest that minority voting is a suitable scheme for such problems. Under such a scheme, only members of the minority in one decision are allowed to vote in the next decision. We discuss a variety of applications and avenues for future research. (C) 2011 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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页码：1 / 13
页数：13
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