The fragility of an independent judiciary: Lessons from Hungary and Poland-and the European Union

被引:70
|
作者
Kovacs, Kriszta [1 ,2 ]
Scheppele, Kim Lane [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Eotvos Lorand Univ, Budapest, Hungary
[2] WZB Ctr Global Constitutionalism, Berlin, Germany
[3] Princeton Univ, Woodrow Wilson Sch, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
[4] Princeton Univ, Dept Sociol, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
关键词
Comparative constitutional law; Judicial independence; Hungary; Poland; European Union; Democratic decline;
D O I
10.1016/j.postcomstud.2018.07.005
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
When the European Union was founded, it was assumed that all Member States admitted as consolidated democracies would maintain their constitutional commitments. In recent years, Hungary and Poland have challenged this premise as elected autocratic governments in those countries have captured independent institutions and threatened longterm democracy. The judiciaries of these countries have been hard hit. In this paper, we trace what has happened to the judiciaries in Hungary and Poland, showing how first the constitutional courts and then the ordinary judiciary have been brought under the control of political forces so that there is no longer a separation of law and politics. We also explore why the European Union has so far not been able to stop this process. In the end, the European judiciary, particularly the Court of Justice, is attempting a rescue of national judiciaries, but the results are so far unclear. (C) 2018 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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页码:189 / 200
页数:12
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