Corporate governance and risk-taking of Islamic banks: evidence from OIC countries

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the impact of corporate governance and other related factors on the risk-taking of Islamic banks. Risk-taking is defined according to credit risk, liquidity risk and operational risk. Design/methodology/approach The study uses the two step system generalized method of moment (2SYS-GMM) estimation technique by using a panel data set of 129 Islamic banks (IBs) from 29 countries in the Middle East, South Asia and the Southeast Asia regions covering from 2008 to 2017. Governance variables incorporated include board size, board independence, chief executive officer (CEO) power, Shariah board and audit committee, as well as other control variables. Findings This study provides evidence that board size and Shariah board are positively and significantly related to credit and liquidity risk. Board independence and CEO power are negative and significantly associated with credit and liquidity risk, but the audit committee has a mixed relationship with bank risk. Male CEOs take more risk compared to the female and more board meeting has an inverse relationship with Islamic banks risk. Bank size, however, does not influence the level of risk in Islamic banks, but leverage has an inverse relationship with bank risk. Research limitations/implications The present study sheds light on the risk-taking behaviour of the board of IBs, particularly the board independence and CEO power reducing the level of risk in IBs thereby contributing to the agency theory. Therefore, regulators and policymakers can use the findings of this study to strengthen the internal corporate governance mechanism to protect IBs at a time of financial distress. Moreover, it increases the trust of the shareholders and stakeholders in the effectiveness of governance reforms that have been pursued to reap long-term benefits. Originality/value To the best of the knowledge, this research is preliminary in examining the board behaviour on risk-taking of IBs from four different regions. The results are robust and suggest that the board of directors mitigate the level of risk in IBs.