Sharing the Big Risk: Assessment Framework for Revenue Risk Sharing Mechanisms in Transportation Public-Private Partnerships
被引:36
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作者:
Liu, Ting
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机构:
Tsinghua Univ, Dept Construct Management, Hang Lung Ctr Real Estate, Beijing 100084, Peoples R ChinaTsinghua Univ, Dept Construct Management, Hang Lung Ctr Real Estate, Beijing 100084, Peoples R China
Liu, Ting
[1
]
Bennon, Michael
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机构:
Stanford Univ, Global Projects Ctr, Stanford, CA 94306 USATsinghua Univ, Dept Construct Management, Hang Lung Ctr Real Estate, Beijing 100084, Peoples R China
Bennon, Michael
[2
]
Garvin, Michael J.
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机构:
Virginia Tech, Dept Civil & Environm Engn, 310A Bishop Favrao Hall, Blacksburg, VA 24061 USATsinghua Univ, Dept Construct Management, Hang Lung Ctr Real Estate, Beijing 100084, Peoples R China
Garvin, Michael J.
[3
]
Wang, Shouqing
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机构:
Tsinghua Univ, Dept Construct Management, Hang Lung Ctr Real Estate, Beijing 100084, Peoples R ChinaTsinghua Univ, Dept Construct Management, Hang Lung Ctr Real Estate, Beijing 100084, Peoples R China
Wang, Shouqing
[1
]
机构:
[1] Tsinghua Univ, Dept Construct Management, Hang Lung Ctr Real Estate, Beijing 100084, Peoples R China
[2] Stanford Univ, Global Projects Ctr, Stanford, CA 94306 USA
[3] Virginia Tech, Dept Civil & Environm Engn, 310A Bishop Favrao Hall, Blacksburg, VA 24061 USA
Public-private partnerships (PPPs);
Toll road;
Revenue risk;
Government fiscal support;
Borrowing capacity;
Value at risk;
Contracting;
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS;
REAL OPTIONS;
GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES;
HIGHWAY CONCESSIONS;
PPP PROJECTS;
MITIGATION;
VALUATION;
CONTRACTS;
FINANCE;
MODEL;
D O I:
10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0001397
中图分类号:
TU [建筑科学];
学科分类号:
0813 ;
摘要:
The allocation and management of revenue risk is a critical issue in the development of public-private partnership (PPP) concessions for new roadways. In order to attract financing, governments often provide fiscal support ranging from availability payments (APs) to minimum revenue guarantees (MRGs) to flexible-term contracts when demand and thus the financial viability of a project are uncertain. However, a government's inability to evaluate these alternatives can lead to either surplus fiscal support ex ante or unexpected liabilities ex post. The authors propose a quantitative methodology to guide governments' decisions when choosing among the fiscal support mechanisms. Based on a comprehensive literature review, we establish a two-dimensional framework to evaluate fiscal support alternatives by comparing their effects on the financing costs of a project and the risk retained by a procuring government. We use a stochastic revenue projection model to quantify the revenue risk and the framework's measurable indicators. We apply our framework using a hypothetical case study. The case results demonstrate that flexible-term contracts do little to increase project leverage, MRGs are most applicable to projects with significant revenue volatility, and APs are more appropriate in projects with lower revenue volatility. The framework allows governments to make more informed decisions about revenue risk sharing mechanisms to improve public budgeting and deficit control. (C) 2017 American Society of Civil Engineers.
机构:
Univ York, Biol Dept, York, N Yorkshire, England
Univ York, Math Dept, York, N Yorkshire, EnglandUniv York, Dept Environm & Geog, York, N Yorkshire, England
Pitchford, Jonathan W.
Touza, Julia
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机构:
Univ York, Dept Environm & Geog, York, N Yorkshire, EnglandUniv York, Dept Environm & Geog, York, N Yorkshire, England