Characteristics of Local Officials and High Quality Development of Chinese Agriculture - Evidence from Chinese Governors and Secretaries of the Provincial Party Committee

被引：5
|
作者：
Cui, Yechen [1 ]
Han, Yali [2 ]
Lv, Ning [1 ,3 ]
Zhu, Honghui [1 ,4 ]
机构：
[1] Shihezi Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Shihezi 832000, Peoples R China
[2] South China Agr Univ, Coll Econ & Management, Guangzhou 510642, Peoples R China
[3] Xinjiang Acad Agr & Reclamat Sci, Shihezi 832000, Peoples R China
[4] Shihezi Univ, Rural Policy Res Ctr 3, Shihezi 832000, Peoples R China
来源：
APPLIED MATHEMATICS AND NONLINEAR SCIENCES | 2020年 / 5卷 / 02期
关键词：
DEA-SBM model; High-quality agricultural development; Local official; Personal characteristic; Tobit regression; ENERGY-CONSUMPTION; ECONOMIC-GROWTH; ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE; EMISSIONS; CO2; PRODUCTIVITY; REGULATIONS; EFFICIENCY; OUTPUTS;
D O I：
10.2478/AMNS.2020.2.00019
中图分类号：
O29 [应用数学];
学科分类号：
070104 ;
摘要：
Local officials play active and important roles in the high-quality agricultural development process in China. In this study, the DEA-SBM model was used to measure the level of agricultural quality development in China, and Tobit regression was conducted to analyze the impacts of officials on agricultural quality development in China. The results showed that between 1997 and 2016, the agricultural GTFP exhibited a downward trend before following an upward trend in China. The personal characteristics of officials had important effects on the development of agricultural quality. In different development stages, officials had diverse effects on agricultural quality development.
引用
收藏
页码：543 / 556
页数：14
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