On Market-Government Relationships in Housing Markets: an Information Screening Model

被引：0
|
作者：
Xie, Zhenfa [1 ]
Yang, Li [1 ]
Hong, Shuhua [1 ]
Ye, Tingting [1 ]
Li, Mengjia [1 ]
机构：
[1] Xiamen Univ, Dept Publ Econ, Xiamen, Peoples R China
来源：
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2009 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT ICPEM 2009, VOL 2: ECONOMIC POLICIES, PLANNING AND ASSESSMENT | 2009年
关键词：
information screening; housing markets; government positioning;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In housing markets, asymmetric information leads to the problem of adverse selection. The profit-maximizing suppliers can realize a second-best outcome through optimal nonlinear pricing. The supply costs in housing sales market are higher than those in rental market. They happen to satisfy different demands for housing, leading to the integration of the two markets With regard to the possible market failures, government intervention in housing markets has its advantages as well as disadvantages.
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页码：284 / 287
页数：4
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