Material private information transmits through social networks. Using manually collected information on networks of alumni reunion cohorts, we show that hedge fund managers connected to directors of firms engaged in merger deals increase call-option holdings on target firms before deal announcements. Effects are larger when reunion events for connected cohorts occur just before announcements. Independent directors, directors with short tenure, and directors with low stock ownership are more likely to transmit information. Our results are robust to confounding factors and alternative specifications. These findings highlight the role of social networks as channels of private-information dissemination.
机构:
Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Sch Accountancy, Shatin, Hong Kong, Peoples R ChinaChinese Univ Hong Kong, Sch Accountancy, Shatin, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
Cao, Ying
Dhaliwal, Dan
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Univ Arizona, Eller Coll Management, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA
Korea Univ, Sch Business, Seoul 136701, South KoreaChinese Univ Hong Kong, Sch Accountancy, Shatin, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
Dhaliwal, Dan
Li, Zengquan
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Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Accounting, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R ChinaChinese Univ Hong Kong, Sch Accountancy, Shatin, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
Li, Zengquan
Yang, Yong George
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Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Sch Accountancy, Shatin, Hong Kong, Peoples R ChinaChinese Univ Hong Kong, Sch Accountancy, Shatin, Hong Kong, Peoples R China