Accounting earnings and executive compensation: The role of earnings persistence

被引：110
|
作者：
Baber, WR
Kang, SH
Kumar, KR
机构：
[1] George Washington Univ, Sch Business & Publ Management, Washington, DC 20052 USA
[2] Yale Univ, Sch Management, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 1998年 / 25卷 / 02期
关键词：
earnings persistence; executive compensation; horizon problem;
D O I：
10.1016/S0165-4101(98)00021-4
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
A cross-sectional analysis of cash compensation paid to CEOs of 713 US firms reveals that the sensitivity of compensation to earnings varies directly with earnings persistence. Additional analysis indicates that this sensitivity is greater for cases where executives are approaching retirement. Such evidence suggests the use of earnings persistence to counterbalance adverse consequences of earnings-based contracting with managers who face finite decision horizons. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：169 / 193
页数：25
相关论文
共 50 条
12345