Blockholders on Boards and CEO Compensation, Turnover and Firm Valuation

被引：20
|
作者：
Agrawal, Anup [1 ]
Nasser, Tareque [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Alabama, Culverhouse Coll Business, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487 USA
[2] Kansas State Univ, Coll Business Adm, 2097 BB,1301 Lovers Lane, Manhattan, KS 66506 USA
来源：
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 2019年 / 9卷 / 03期
关键词：
Boards of directors; blockholders; executive compensation; CEO turnover; firm valuation; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES; VENTURE CAPITALISTS; MATCHING ESTIMATORS; LARGE SHAREHOLDERS; PROPENSITY SCORE; DIRECTORS; OWNERSHIP; PERFORMANCE; STOCK;
D O I：
10.1142/S2010139219500101
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
We find that the presence of independent directors who are blockholders (IDBs) in firms promotes better CEO contracting and monitoring, and higher firm valuation. Using a panel of about 11,500 firm-years with a unique, hand-collected dataset on IDB-identity and a novel instrument, we find that firms with IDBs have lower excess CEO pay, lower flow and stock of CEO equity incentives, and higher valuations. These effects are substantial and robust. Our findings imply that by making it easier for blockholders to obtain a board seat, proxy access rules or bylaws can benefit shareholders.
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页数：67
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