Corporate R&D activities are inherently risky but also difficult to monitor. Against this background, we examine the impact of ownership concentration and legal shareholder rights protection on corporate R&D investments in emerging markets. Based on a comprehensive sample of publicly listed firms from 24 countries, we find that R&D intensity is lower in firms with (strategic) block ownership, and this effect is more pronounced in countries with stronger shareholder rights protection. This suggests that, similar to the situation in developed economies, dispersed ownership, which allows shareholders to diversify their investment risks, is beneficial for corporate R&D and that this effect is intensified by more developed institutions.
机构:
Fordham Univ, Gabelli Sch Business, New York, NY 10019 USA
Bank Finland, FI-00101 Helsinki, FinlandFordham Univ, Gabelli Sch Business, New York, NY 10019 USA
Hasan, Iftekhar
Raymar, Steven
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Fordham Univ, Gabelli Sch Business, New York, NY 10019 USAFordham Univ, Gabelli Sch Business, New York, NY 10019 USA
Raymar, Steven
Song, Liang
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机构:
Michigan Technol Univ, Houghton, MI 49931 USAFordham Univ, Gabelli Sch Business, New York, NY 10019 USA
机构:
Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Int Business Adm, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R ChinaShanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Int Business Adm, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
Dong, Jing
Gou, Yan-nan
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Fudan Univ, Sch Int Relat & Publ Affairs, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R ChinaShanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Int Business Adm, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
机构:
China Univ Min & Technol Beijing, Sch Management, Beijing 100083, Peoples R ChinaChina Univ Min & Technol Beijing, Sch Management, Beijing 100083, Peoples R China