Extended Cognition and Propositional Memory

The philosophical case for extended cognition is often made with reference to extended-memory cases' (e.g. Clark & Chalmers 1998); though, unfortunately, proponents of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) as well as their adversaries have failed to appreciate the kinds of epistemological problems extended-memory cases pose for mainstream thinking in the epistemology of memory. It is time to give these problems a closer look. Our plan is as follows: in 1, we argue that an epistemological theory remains compatible with HEC only if its epistemic assessments do not violate what we call the epistemic parity principle'. In 2, we show how the constraint of respecting the epistemic parity principle stands in what appears to be a prima facie intractable tension with mainstream thinking about cases of propositional memory. We then outline and evaluate in 3 several lines of response.