NEUROSCIENCE, FREE WILL AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

被引:2
|
作者
Arnason, Gardar [1 ]
机构
[1] Leibniz Univ Hannover, Inst Philosophie, D-30167 Hannover, Germany
关键词
free will; neuroscience; responsibility; determinism; reductionism; Libet experiments; CONSCIOUS INTENTION; AWARENESS; BRAIN;
D O I
10.3176/tr.2011.2.03
中图分类号
C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
Neuroscientific challenges to free will work on at least three levels: there is a metaphysical level, an epistemological level, and an empirical level. In this paper I discuss the main neuroscientific challenges on each of these three levels. Three fundamental conditions for free will can also be placed on these levels, and I briefly discuss how these conditions can be met in the context of the neuroscientific challenges. In conclusion I strongly doubt that neuroscientific evidence can show free will not to exist at all.
引用
收藏
页码:147 / 155
页数:9
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