This article shows that the introduction of a conditional collective bonus in an agri-environmental scheme (AES) can improve farmers' participation and increase land enrolment for lower overall budgetary costs. This monetary bonus is paid in addition to the usual AES payment if a given threshold is reached in terms of aggregate farmer participation. Using a choice experiment, we estimate the preferences of winegrowers in the South of France for such a bonus. We show that it contributes to increased expectations of farmers on others' participation, therefore shifting a pro-environmental social norm and favouring the adoption of less pesticide-intensive farming practices.
机构:
Univ Strasbourg, UMR GESTE MA 8101, Strasbourg, France
EIFER European Inst Energy Res EDF & KIT, Karlsruhe, GermanyUniv Strasbourg, UMR GESTE MA 8101, Strasbourg, France
机构:
ENGEES, UMR GESTE MA 8101, 1 Quai Koch, F-67000 Strasbourg, France
Univ Strasbourg, F-67000 Strasbourg, FranceENGEES, UMR GESTE MA 8101, 1 Quai Koch, F-67000 Strasbourg, France
Limbach, Kristin
Rozan, Anne
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
ENGEES, UMR GESTE MA 8101, 1 Quai Koch, F-67000 Strasbourg, France
Univ Strasbourg, F-67000 Strasbourg, FranceENGEES, UMR GESTE MA 8101, 1 Quai Koch, F-67000 Strasbourg, France