The Impact of Compensation Committee Quality and CEO Power on Director and Supervisor Compensation in Loss-Making Firms

被引:1
|
作者
Wang, Teng-Shih [1 ]
Huang, Shaio-Yan [2 ]
Lee, Yi-Yan [2 ]
机构
[1] Providence Univ, Dept Accounting, Taichung, Taiwan
[2] Natl Chung Cheng Univ, Dept Accounting & Informat Technol, Chiayi, Taiwan
来源
关键词
Compensation committee quality; CEO power; Compensation of the board of directors and supervisor; Loss-making firms; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; MANAGERIAL POWER; BOARD; PERFORMANCE; DUALITY;
D O I
10.6552/JOAR.202207_(75).0004
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper aims to investigate the effect of the quality of compensation committee on the self-interested board of directors after the establishment of mandatory compensation committee. Moreover, this paper investigates the role of CEO power in the relationship between compensation committee quality and the self-interested board of directors. From the data of listed companies between 2012 and 2017, we find that firms with better compensation committees and higher CEO power can reduce the phenomenon of loss making firms yet increasing their director and supervisor compensation. However, we also find that CEO power cannot moderate the relationship between the quality of a compensation committee and a board compensation increase in a loss-making firm. Our results demonstrate that when the CEO has greater power, the compensation committee is less effective to prevent the board of directors and supervisors in loss-making firms from gaining unreasonably high compensation
引用
收藏
页码:137 / 180
页数:44
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