A dynamic theory of bank lending, firm entry, and investment fluctuations

被引：4
|
作者：
Hu, Yunzhi [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ N Carolina, Kenan Flagler Business Sch, CB 3490, Chapel Hill, NC 27599 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2022年 / 204卷
关键词：
Bank lending standards; Dynamic adverse selection; Endogenous entry; Credit cycles; ENDOGENOUS LIQUIDITY; ADVERSE SELECTION; MARKET; BOOMS; EQUILIBRIUM; LEVERAGE; BAD;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jet.2022.105515
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper models a two-way dynamic feedback mechanism between bank lending standards and firm entry. The composition of the borrower pool affects banks' screening decisions and the credit terms they offer. Likewise, lending standards affect potential entrepreneurs' decisions to start new firms, varying the borrower pool. Firms delay borrowing when they wait for banks to finish screening or when they expect the borrower pool to improve soon. The model's predictions are consistent with basic facts on bank lending and firm entry. Moreover, the model explains why recoveries are particularly slow when preceded by large and long-term booms. (c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页数：34
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