Optimal Carried Interest: Adverse Selection in Islamic and Conventional Venture Capital and Private-Equity Funds

被引:0
|
作者
Mehri, Meryem [1 ]
Hassan, M. Kabir [2 ]
Jouaber-Snoussi, Kaouther [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Paris Dauphine, Zitouna Bank Tunisia, Tunis, Tunisia
[2] Univ New Orleans, Dept Econ & Finance, New Orleans, LA 70148 USA
[3] Univ Paris 09, DRM Finance, Paris, France
关键词
Adverse selection; hidden skill; optimal compensation; profit-sharing ratio; risk aversion; COMPENSATION; MODEL;
D O I
10.1080/1540496X.2016.1166424
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In an optimal carried interest model with adverse selection, the optimal profit-loss sharing ratio (PSR) explains how the risk aversion of the two parties can affect their bargaining powers by allowing investors to detect the true risk aversion of fund managers and not their true skills. The higher the management fee, the higher is the PSR. Our simulation exercise shows that when the fund manager is more risk averse than the investor for a higher invested capital and weaker expected net profit, the optimal negotiated profit-sharing ratio will be higher.
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收藏
页码:1458 / 1476
页数:19
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