A Principal-Agent Theory Perspective on PPP Risk Allocation

被引:30
|
作者
Shrestha, Asheem [1 ]
Tamosaitiene, Jolanta [2 ]
Martek, Igor [1 ]
Hosseini, M. Reza [1 ]
Edwards, David J. [3 ]
机构
[1] Deakin Univ, Sch Architecture & Built Environm, 1 Gheringhap St, Geelong, Vic 3220, Australia
[2] Vilnius Gediminas Tech Univ, Fac Civil Engn, Sauletekio Al 11, LT-10223 Vilnius, Lithuania
[3] Birmingham City Univ, Fac Comp Engn & Built Environm, City Ctr Campus, Birmingham B47XG, W Midlands, England
关键词
risk allocation; public private partnerships; PPP; principal-agent theory; PUBLIC-PRIVATE-PARTNERSHIPS; MORAL HAZARD; PROJECTS; CHINA; MANAGEMENT; BEHAVIOR; SUCCESS; WATER; PERFORMANCE; PROCUREMENT;
D O I
10.3390/su11226455
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
This study proposes a framework for the allocation of risk in public private partnerships (PPP) projects. Its contribution lies in the recognition and incorporation of risks introduced by project stakeholders, and as articulated by the principal-agent theory (PAT). The framework assesses risks and routes these risks to those parties best equipped to mitigate their impact on the project. This allocation of risk is facilitated by a thirteen-step process. The practical benefit of this study lies in outlining a clear, systematic method for allocating risk efficiently to both the government and private enterprise parties of the project. In so doing, risk mitigation can be expected to improve project performance, optimize stakeholder goals, and enhance sustainability objectives, including improved operational life-cycle efficiency and elevated social and community benefits.
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页数:18
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