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Shareholder litigation rights and the cost of debt: Evidence from derivative lawsuits
被引:79
|作者:
Ni, Xiaoran
[1
,2
]
Yin, Sirui
[3
]
机构:
[1] Xiamen Univ, Dept Finance, Sch Econ, Xiamen 361005, Fujian, Peoples R China
[2] Xiamen Univ, Wang Yanan Inst Studies Econ WISE, Xiamen 361005, Fujian, Peoples R China
[3] Univ Arizona, Eller Coll Management, Dept Finance, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA
关键词:
Shareholder litigation right;
Universal demand law;
Cost of debt;
Corporate governance;
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE;
EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS;
PROPENSITY SCORE;
AGENCY COSTS;
RISK-TAKING;
FINANCE;
RESPONSES;
BOARDS;
MARKET;
CAUSAL;
D O I:
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.10.008
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
Exploiting the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws as exogenous shocks to filing derivative lawsuits, we find that weakened shareholder litigation rights cause a significant increase in the cost of debt. Deteriorated corporate governance, increased information asymmetry, and heightened managerial risk-taking are the underlying channels. Shareholders respond to weakened litigation rights by providing managers with less risk-taking incentives. Overall, our findings suggest that the shareholder litigation rights are important to debtholders. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码:169 / 186
页数:18
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