A Game-Theoretic Approach to Derivation of President Barack Obama's North Korea Policy

This paper focuses on the derivation of President Barack Obama's policy options toward North Korea by setting up a game-theoretic framework of sequential negotiations between North Korea and South Korea and between North Korea and the United States (U.S.). Based on this framework, two distinctive objectives of Kim Jong-il's regime in the North are identified: the development of nuclear weapons and regime succession by Kim Jong-il's family. To understand North Korea's strategy of brinkmanship, the author makes reference to the game of "chicken" to frame how Kim Jong-il attempts to signal to President Obama that North Korea is prepared to launch a nuclear strike against the U.S. and its allies. It is demonstrably the case that in playing games on a short-term basis, North Korea's Kim Jong-il and his supporters are acting as strategically as their American counterparts. However, they appear to lack foresight with regard to formulating long-term national strategies. The government of North Korea seems to believe that time is always on its side, which could account for its termination of diplomatic negotiations. While delaying the Six-Party Talks, North Korea's military leaders endeavored to expand and test their nuclear capabilities. It will be necessary for North Korea to change its game strategy in the future, as it becomes more apparent that Kim Jong-il's leadership will not endure.