SME investment and financing under asymmetric information

被引：7
|
作者：
Wang, Yao [1 ,2 ]
Zhang, Hai [3 ]
Zhao, Zhiming [1 ]
机构：
[1] Xiangtan Univ, Sch Business, Yanggutang St, Xiangtan 411105, Hunan, Peoples R China
[2] Renmin Univ China, Sch Finance, Beijing, Peoples R China
[3] Strathclyde Business Sch, Dept Accounting & Finance, Glasgow, Lanark, Scotland
来源：
EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT | 2022年 / 28卷 / 05期
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
asymmetric information; equity-for-guarantee swap; least-cost equilibrium; real option; SME financing; ARITHMETIC BROWNIAN-MOTION; CAPITAL STRUCTURE;
D O I：
10.1111/eufm.12342
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
We investigate the investment timing and financing decisions of financially constrained small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in a real-option setting with asymmetric information. 'Bad' firms can sell over-priced securities by mimicking in a pooling equilibrium. However, 'good' firms can separate from bad firms by imposing an adverse selection cost for mimicry only when the benefit of being recognized as the 'good' type outweighs the investment distortion costs. Further, asymmetric information induces good firms to accelerate investment, leading to investment distortion and higher guarantee costs. Equity-for-guarantee swap not only mitigates SMEs' financing constraints but also reduces the investment and finance distortions.
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页码：1347 / 1375
页数：29
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